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We study a model with a durable good subject to abrupt, periodic obsolescence,
and characterize the optimal purchasing policy. Consumers optimally synchronize new
purchases with the arrival of new durable models. Hence, some agents use a "ﬂexible"
optimal replacement rule that switches between two adjacent replacement frequencies
at irregular intervals. These agents react to wealth shocks by changing the timing of
future purchases.
The model has distinct comparative statics on obsolescence and durability and can
explain how durables with high depreciation rates may have more volatile expenditure.
The model also predicts how demand ﬂuctuations respond to a change in product
variety. These predictions match the observed changes in volatility of the US auto
sales after the introduction of smaller foreign cars in the 1970s.
1 Introduction
Obsolescence is the major reason for depreciation of durables in markets with technologi-
cal innovation.1 Since much of this innovation is incorporated in new durables, modeling
obsolescence of durable goods is vital for our understanding of macroeconomic eﬀects.
Depreciation is usually modeled as gradual wear and tear, but obsolescence is diﬀerent
in two important respects. First, obsolescence aﬀects all durables at the same time. For
example, all analog TVs, no matter how new, will depreciate at the same time when the
broadcasting switches to digital format (HDTV). Second, obsolescence does not happen at a
constant rate; rather, it is periodic and abrupt. One reason for this is costly development of
new products.2 For example, car bodies are redesigned every 4-5 years, and new generations
of Intel processors appear, on average, every 3 years. Another reason is that obsolescence is
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1One of the most dramatic examples of obsolescence is computers, whose quality-adjusted price has been
falling at an average rate of 23.5% a year during 1960-2000. The average annual obsolescence rate for
communication equipment is 8.7%, and for automobiles is 2.5% (Cummins and Violante, 2002, Table II).
2Fishman and Rob (2000) show that it is optimal for the durable goods producer to introduce new models
periodically.
1related to the periodic arrival of innovations shared by many goods, such as, for example,
the LCD display, the compact disc or the lithium-ion battery. This means that obsolescence
is a function of the good’s technological, rather than physical, age. Computers and many
other types of equipment have the same pattern of obsolescence. Since designs for durables
start aging immediately, consumers who purchase a certain model late in its life cycle will
enjoy a lower service ﬂow. Hence, obsolescence gives consumers an incentive to coordinate
their replacement decisions with the introductions of new models. This coordination may
have important eﬀects on demand ﬂuctuations and propagation of shocks.
We consider an economy with inﬁnitely lived agents who consume a durable and a non-
durable good. Agents diﬀer in their permanent income level, and can borrow and lend at
an exogenously given interest rate. The durable is produced by a competitive industry with
CRS technology. There are no secondary markets for used durables; units that are replaced
are thrown away. Consequently, durables are purchased infrequently because the service
from a current unit acts as a ﬁxed opportunity cost of adjustment.
We solve analytically for the optimal consumption paths of individuals. Consumers
optimally synchronize their new durable purchases with the design cycle. Although durables
can be replaced at any time, consumers only purchase them at dates when new models are
introduced. That is, agents only choose holding periods that are multiples of the design cycle
length.3 Since the relevant choices of holding periods are discrete, the consumers smooth
consumption by alternating between two holding periods from time to time.
Consumers endogenously partition themselves into classes according to their wealth and
the age of their durable goods, with each class following a diﬀerent durable replacement rule.
Two types of rules are optimal. One type, which we term a “ﬁxed” rule, is an (s,S) policy
with a constant replacement frequency. The other type is a “ﬂexible” rule that alternates
between two adjacent ﬁxed rules at irregular intervals.
Ak e yd i ﬀerence between the two types of rules is how the agents react to unexpected
changes in wealth. Consumers that follow a ﬁxed rule adjust only their non-durable con-
sumption in response to a marginal windfall. By contrast, consumers that follow ﬂexible
rules adjust only the timing of the durable purchases. This dichotomy in response to shocks
gives our model the ﬂexibility to match several empirical regularities in consumption.
Empirically, aggregate durable consumption is more volatile than non-durable consump-
tion (e.g. Attanasio (1999), p. 746). The usual explanation for this regularity is that
durables have more volatile consumption because they have a lower depreciation rate than
non-durables. But, this logic also predicts that consumption of durables with lower depre-
ciation rate should exhibit higher volatility. The empirical evidence seems to contradict this
prediction. We compare the consumption of furniture, computers and cars, and ﬁnd that
consumption is more volatile for durables with higher rates of economic depreciation. Our
model can match both pieces of evidence because it predicts separate eﬀects for obsolescence
and durability. We show that the total mass of consumers in ﬂexible rule classes grows
with the length of the good’s life and with the rate of obsolescence. Accordingly, our model
predicts that consumption of longer-lived durables is more variable, and that consumption
of durables with higher obsolescence rate is also more variable. The former prediction agrees
with the evidence on aggregate consumption, and the latter one helps explain the data on
diﬀerent durable markets.
3This strong form of synchronization is partly due to perfect competition which makes the relative price
of durables constant and uncorrelated with demand. If prices of new models were falling over time, some
consumers would have incentives to buy in the middle of the design cycle.
2According to Caballero (1990), aggregate durable purchases are slow to respond to aggre-
gate wealth shocks. This eﬀect takes a very strong form in our model because no one buys
durables in the middle of the design cycle. All changes in durable expenditure are delayed
until the next model is introduced. The evidence on this delay comes from household pur-
chases of computers. In particular, computer expenditure exhibits sharp accelerations (and
subsequent fast fall-oﬀs) around the dates when new Intel processors became available. This
feature of aggregate demand is consistent with households waiting to buy or replace their
computer until the new model arrives.
In our model, durable demand ﬂuctuates because consumers accelerate or delay durable
purchases as a response to wealth shocks. Empirically, the number of automobiles purchased
is much more variable than expenditure per auto (Bar-Ilan and Blinder, 1992, p. 263), and
very little of this variation is due to the echo eﬀects from past automobile sales (Adda and
Cooper, 2000). It is diﬃcult for an (S,s) model with an unconstrained menu of durable sizes
to match this observation. In the (s,S) model all consumers choose the same replacement
frequency and vary the purchase size to smooth consumption.4 This means that all ﬂuctua-
tions in the demand for cars must be a result of echo eﬀects from past sales, and not because
of shifts in purchase timing. We show how this prediction can be reversed. We extend our
m o d e lt oi n c l u d et h ec h o i c eo fp u r c h a s es i z ef r o ms o m ef e a s i b l ei n t e r v a l . I nt h eo p t i m u m ,
there is a group of consumers who are constrained by purchase size. These agents react to
wealth shocks as if there was only one size available and adjust either non-durable consump-
tion or purchase timing. In contrast, a consumer that is unconstrained by size does not
modify the timing of future purchases and adjusts the size. The total mass of unconstrained
consumers grows with the range of available sizes. Therefore, one should expect purchase
timing to respond to shocks less and purchase size to respond more in markets with more
variety of sizes. The history of the auto industry in the US oﬀers a natural test. The rapid
penetration of smaller foreign autos on the US market in the 1970s can be viewed as an
increase in variety. In line with our predictions, we ﬁnd that the number of new autos per
adult became less volatile and the purchase size became more volatile in the 1980s and 90s.
Our work is related to a large literature that studies models with infrequent replacement
of durable goods. Most of this literature considers optimal (s,S) replacement policies. There
are three broad categories of related (s,S) models. The ﬁrst category includes representative
a g e n tm o d e l sw i t hab u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t( e . g .G r ossman and Laroque (1990), Eberly (1994)).
These models have only one good, the durable, and thus look at durable consumption sep-
arately. The second category includes replacement models with aggregate dynamics (e.g.
Caballero and Engel (1999), Caplin and Leahy (1999), Adda and Cooper (2000)). These pa-
pers consider a replacement problem without an inter-period budget constraint. The model
of Adda and Cooper (2000) includes durables and non-durables, but does not allow borrow-
ing and lending. The third body of literature (e.g. Caballero (1993), Attanasio (2000)) does
not consider the optimal replacement problem but assumes that the optimal replacement
policy for the durable is an (s,S) rule. Apart from having a diﬀerent model, we develop a
solution methodology that can be used in other replacement problems with indivisibilities.
Our work also contributes to a broader macroeconomic literature that studies the inter-
action of durable and non-durable consumption and the propagation of income and wealth
shocks. In our model, periodic obsolescence determines the optimal timing of durable pur-
chases, and this, in turn, aﬀects how shocks propagate. Leahy and Zeira (2000) derive a
4This result is general as long as the depreciation rate for the durable is not a function of the purchase
size. See Appendix 2 for details.
3closely related result in a framework where consumers buy the durable only once in their
lifetime. They ﬁnd what they call an “insulation eﬀect”: both non-durable consumption and
the size of the durable are unaﬀected by wealth shocks, but the timing of purchases is. Our
analysis oﬀers a few caveats for the insulation eﬀect. When the size is ﬁxed, an aggregate
shock aﬀects the timing of purchases selectively, depending on the type of replacement rule.
Only ﬂexible-rule consumers adjust the timing of future purchases; ﬁxed-rule consumers ad-
just their non-durable consumption instead. When the size is variable, the insulation eﬀect
depends on whether or not there are binding constraints on sizes. If size is unconstrained
and the durable can be bought repeatedly, the insulation eﬀect is reversed: the wealth shock
is fully absorbed by adjustments of size and non-durable consumption. Then aggregate unit
sales are completely insulated from wealth shocks.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 separately solves the durable consumption
problem. We construct optimal policies using a very simple geometric argument. Section 4
determines the optimal allocation of wealth between durable and non-durable consumption
and derives our key comparative statics. In Section 5 we match our results with observations
on aggregate consumption behavior. Section 6 extends the model to allow variable purchase
size and discusses its empirical implications. Section 7 concludes.
2M o d e l
We consider a dynamic economy with two goods, a durable and a non-durable good, and
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exogenously, and they stay constant over time.
Goods, technology and preferences: The durable good is indivisible and is produced
by a constant returns to scale technology that uses p0 units of the non-durable good for each
unit of the durable good. New durables (new models) are introduced regularly into the
market at times τ ∈ N = {0,1,...}. Without loss of generality, we have normalized to
1 the length of a design cycle. We refer to the durable introduced at time τ as “ model
τ”. The technological age of a durable good is the number of new models introduced since
it was produced. The consumers are inﬁnitely-lived and have a (common) discount rate ρ
and a (common) separable ﬂow utility function v(α,c)=xα + u(c),w h e r eα ∈ {0,1,...,T}
denotes the technological age of the durable good, and c is the consumption ﬂow for the
non-durable. Durable go o d so fa n ya g el e s st h a nT are perfect substitutes and each agent
consumes at most one unit (additional units provide no utility). We think of the non-durable
good as money for the consumption of other goods, and of u as an indirect utility function.
We assume that u0 > 0, u00 < 0, u0(0) = ∞,a n dx0 ≥ x1 ≥ ···xT−1 >x T =0 .
Obsolescence is the only form of depreciation in our model. A durable becomes useless
when its technological age is T or more. A new model τ provides a ﬂow service of x0 in the
period [τ,τ +1 ) . When a new model is introduced at time τ +1 ,m o d e lτ’s ﬂow service
decreases to x1, and so on. The consumers can buy a new durable at any moment, but the
durable is depreciated as soon as the new model is introduced. Thus, if a consumer buys a
new durable at time t ∈ [τ,τ +1 ) ,h eg e t st h eﬂow service x0 in the interval [t,τ +1 ) ,a n d
then the ﬂow service x1 in the interval [τ +1,τ+2), and so on, as long as he doesn’t replace
the durable.
Our model assumes that a durable good becomes less useful as soon as a new model
appears in the market. But, in Appendix 1 we show that in a model where the ﬂow service
4of a durable remains constant for its lifetime, we can re-normalize utility and deﬁne xα as
the relative utility of a durable with respect to the latest model. In the example of Appendix
1, xα = g(T − α),w h e r eg is the average rate of technical progress in durables. In this case
x falls with α simply because better goods become available at the same price.
The consumers can borrow and lend, but there are no secondary markets for used
durables.
Prices: Since the production technology is CRS, the price ratio of the durable good to the
non-durable good is equal to p0 at all times. We will assume that the interest rate is ﬁxed and
equal to the discount rate: r(t)=ρ for all t ≥ 0. We therefore perform a partial equilibrium
analysis. We think of the market for durables as being a small part of the aggregate economy
and hence ignore the eﬀect of durable demand on the interest rate. Our choice of interest
rate is consistent with stationary equilibria. In a general equilibrium model where income
(resource) ﬂow and production technology are constant over time, a stationary equilibrium
would imply a constant interest rate equal to the discount rate. If q(t) and p(t) denote,
respectively, the prices of the non-durable and durable goods at time t, our assumption of a
constant interest rate implies that q(t)=e−ρt and p(t)=p0q(t) for all t ≥ 0, where we have
normalized so that q(0) = 1.D e ﬁne the total discount rate for one period β = e−ρ.
Consumer problem: Given his initial state (α,w),w h e r eα ∈ {1,...,T} is the age of
his endowed durable and w is his total wealth, a consumer chooses a sequence of durable
purchase dates and a non-durable consumption path to maximize his discounted lifetime
utility,
R ∞
0 e−ρt[xαt + u(ct)]dt, subject to a lifetime budget constraint. An agent’s current
wealth is equal to the present discounted value of all his future earnings, y/ρ,m i n u st h e
present discounted value of his debts (past borrowing minus lending).
Since r(t)=ρ for all t and utility is additively separable, optimally, non-durable con-
sumption must be constant over time. Indeed, the (necessary and suﬃcient) ﬁrst-order
condition for non-durable consumption is in this case e−ρtu0(c(t)) = λe−ρt for all t,w h e r e
λ>0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. This implies that c(t)=c(0) for
all t>0.
Let ˆ u(c) be the discounted non-durable consumption utility over one period (of length
1) in which a consumer spends (optimally) a budget c. This budget aﬀords the constant





















Let the consumer spend a constant non-durable budget c per period. Then, his lifetime
non-durable discounted utility and total budget are respectively ˆ u(c)/(1−β) and c/(1−β),
and his residual budget for the consumption of durables is b = w − c/(1 − β).
Let Vα(b) denote the optimal durable consumption utility of a consumer that is endowed
with a good of age α and spends a total budget b on durables. Then the problem of an agent
with initial state (α,w) is











In Section 3, we explicitly construct the functions Vα, α ∈ {1,...,T}, and in Section 4
we obtain the full solution for problem (1).
53 Durable consumption problem
Discrete Time: As a preliminary step in analyzing the durable consumption problem, we
study a discrete time problem where the consumers are arbitrarily constrained to make new
purchases only at the beginning of every period, that is, at times t ∈ N. We subsequently
show that removing this restriction does not change the optimal durable purchasing policy.
A consumer must choose the periods when he purchases a (new) unit of the durable good.
A durable purchasing policy δ = {δt}t≥0 speciﬁes the periods in which the agent buys a new
unit (δt =1 ) or keeps the old unit he has (δt =0 ). For any i,j ∈ N,l e ti⊕j =m i n {i+j,T}
and iªj =m a x {i−j,0}. Given an initial unit of age α−1,5 a purchasing policy determines
t h ea g eo ft h eu n i tc o n s u m e di ne v e r yp e r i o dt ≥ 0 recursively as follows: αt =0if δt =1
and αt = αt−1 ⊕ 1 if δt =0 .













where ˆ xα = xα(1 − β)/ρ denotes the total discounted utility from the consumption of a
durable of age α over one period.
We solve the potentially diﬃcult integer programming problem above using a direct
geometric argument focusing on a particularly simple class of policies.
Deﬁnition: For each R =1 ,...,T, a policy δ that replaces the durable every time it
reaches age R is called an R-ﬁxed rule.T h a ti s ,δ is an R-ﬁxed rule if for all t, δt =1if and
only if αt−1 = R − 1.A(T +1 ) -ﬁxed rule is to never replace the durable: δt =0for all t.






0 α ≥ R.
For R ≤ T, the value of following the R-ﬁxed rule starting with a useless durable (α = T)
equals vT,R = X0,R/(1−β
R), and its corresponding budget is bT,R = p0/(1−β
R).T h ev a l u e
and budget of the (T +1 ) -ﬁxed rule are both zero.
Construct a piecewise linear function by joining the adjacent points (bT,R+1,v T,R+1) and
(bT,R,v T,R) (1 ≤ R ≤ T) with straight lines. Theorem 1 below states that this piecewise
linear function is VT.M o r e o v e r ,VT is concave (see the left frame of Figure 1 below).
Assume that α = T and for an arbitrary purchasing policy δ, group purchases by their
“replacement age”. That is, for each R =1 ,...,T,l e tLR be the purchase dates of all
durable that are used for R periods and then replaced at age R. Compute the weight




t and let λT+1 =1−
PT
R=1 λR. Roughly, the weight λR corresponds
to the fraction of purchases that result in the replacement of a durable at age R. For example,
if the policy is an R-ﬁxed rule with R<T+1 ,t h e nLR contains all the periods t where
5To deal with period 0 as with any other period, we specify the age that the endowed durable would have
been in the “previous period”.
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Figure 1: Optimal value function
δt =1 ,s ot h a tλR =1and λk =0for all k 6= R.L e t(b,v) denote the budget and value of














Since the weights λR are nonnegative and add up to 1, the right-hand side is a convex
combination of the points {(vT,R,b T,R)}
T+1
R=1.T h a ti s ,t h ep o i n t(b,v) must be in the convex
hull of {(vT,R,b T,R)}
T+1
R=1, as depicted in Figure 1. Note that the upper frontier of this set
coincides with the graph of the posited optimal value function VT. Hence, v ≤ VT(b).
The upper bound VT(b) is attained by a particular type of policy. Suppose R is such that
b ∈ [bT,R+1,b T,R],a n dl e tδ
∗ be a policy that replaces durables at age R or R +1only.
Such a policy is called an R-ﬂexible rule. Its corresponding weights satisfy λ
∗
k =0for
all k/ ∈ {R,R +1 }. By appropriately choosing the periods when durables of age R or




R+1bT,R+1 (as we explain






R+1vT,R+1 = VT(b).T h a ti s ,δ
∗ is optimal for the budget b.
For an arbitrary α now, let bα,R and vα,R denote the cost and the value of following the



















for all R ≤ T
and (bα,T+1,v α,T+1)=( 0 ,X α,T). I ti sa l s oc o n v e n i e n tt od e ﬁne bT+1,T+1 = p0 and b0,1 =
βp0/(1 − β). Rules that replace goods more frequently require bigger budgets and have
higher values. Hence bα,R >b α,R+1 and vα,R >v α,R+1.
The piecewise linear function obtained by joining the adjacent points (bα,R+1,v α,R+1) and
(bα,R,v α,R) (1 ≤ R ≤ T) with straight lines is the optimal value function Vα (see Theorem
1 below). Figure 1 (right frame) presents simultaneously the optimal value functions V1, V2
and V3 for the case when T =3 .
Deﬁnition: Let 1 ≤ R ≤ T − 1 and b ≥ 0. A policy δ is an (R,b)-ﬂexible rule if it
replaces durables only when they are of age R or age R+1and spends the budget b exactly.
If δ is an (R,b)-ﬂexible rule then for all t, δt =1implies that αt−1 ∈ {R − 1,R}.
7Since an (R,b)-ﬂexible rule sometimes replaces goods at age R, and sometimes at age
R +1 , it costs more than an (R +1 ) -ﬁxed rule but less than an R-ﬁxed rule. Hence, when
the endowed good is of age α, b must be in the interval [bα,R+1,b α,R]. As we will see, for
b ∈ (bα,R+1,b α,R), there are multiple (R,b)-ﬂexible rules. The R-ﬁxed and the (R +1 ) -ﬁxed
rules are both special cases of the (R,b)-ﬂexible rule for b = bT,R and b = bT,R+1, respectively.















Note that AR is independent of α and equals the slope of Vα on [bα,R+1,b α,R].I ti se a s yt o
check that AT >A T−1 > ···>A 1 > 0, and therefore Vα is indeed a concave function.
Theorem 1: Assume that
β
T−1(1 + β) > 1. (2)
For each α =1 ,...,T, the optimal value function Vα is
Vα(b)=vα,R+1 + AR(b − bα,R+1),b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R],R = T,...,1,
and for any budget b ≥ 0, a corresponding optimal purchasing policy is an (R,b)-ﬂexible rule,
where R is such that b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R] (when b = bα,R, this policy coincides with the R-ﬁxed







0 for b<b α+1,α+1
{0,1} for bα+1,α+1 ≤ b ≤ bα−1,α
1 for b>b α−1,α.
(3)
Proof: See Appendix 1.
A s s u m p t i o n( 2 )i se q u i v a l e n tt oβ>¯ β,w h e r e¯ β i st h e( u n i q u e )r o o to fβ
T−1(1 + β)=1 .
T h i si st h es a m ea sa s s u m i n gt h a tρ<¯ ρ,w h e r e¯ ρ = e−¯ β.W h e nβ is relatively small, there
are budgets b that do not correspond to any durable purchasing policy. The intuition is
clear. Suppose β is close to 0. Then the durable budget is almost fully determined by the
timing of the ﬁrst purchase. Let α<R , δ be an R-ﬂexible rule, and b be its corresponding
budget. If the ﬁr s tp u r c h a s eh a p p e n sw h e nt h eg o o di so fa g eR,t h e nb ∼ bα,R (even if all
subsequent purchases replace durables of age R +1 ), and if it happens at age R +1 ,t h e n
b ∼ bα,R+1 (even if all subsequent purchases replace durables of age R). Hence, budgets
around the middle of the interval (bα,R+1,b α,R) are unattainable.
An agent that follows an R-ﬂexible rule replaces goods of age R or R +1 , but he is not
always indiﬀerent between these replacement ages. To follow an R-ﬂexible rule requires that
in each period the agent maintain a budget that is compatible with this rule. Assume that
the durable has reached age R in the current period. Then, the current budget b must be
in the interval [bR,R+1,b R,R]. Suppose b is close to bR,R. If the agent keeps the good this
period, his budget next period would be b/β > bR+1,R, too large to follow the R-ﬂexible
rule from that point onward. Therefore, the agent can keep the durable this period only
if b ∈ [bR,R+1,b R−1,R];i fb>b R−1,R, the agent must replace now at age R.N o w a s s u m e
that b is close to bR,R+1. If the agent replaces the durable now, his budget next period
would be (b−p0)/β < b1,R+1, too small to follow the R-ﬂexible rule from that point onward.
Therefore, the agent can replace his durable of age R this period only if b ∈ [bR+1,R+1,b R,R];
8if b<b R+1,R+1, the agent must keep the durable for one more period. Assumption (2) also
guarantees that bR+1,R+1 <b R−1,R,a n df o rb ∈ [bR+1,R+1,b R−1,R] both keeping and replacing
the durable this period are consistent with the R-ﬂexible rule. For this interval of budgets,
the agent is indiﬀerent between replacing the durable now at age R a n dn e x tp e r i o da ta g e
R +1 .
Continuous Time: We now allow consumers to purchase durables at times other than
t ∈ N and show that this does not change the optimal value function. For the continuous
time replacement problem, we need a more detailed representation of the durable purchasing
policy. Let τk denote the period (or, equivalently, the model number) and dk ∈ [0,1) be the
“delay” of the k-th purchase, so the time of the k-th purchase is τk + dk. The following
theorem states that it is optimal to set dk =0for all k.
Theorem 2: For each α =1 ,...,T, the optimal value function is
Vα(b)=vα,R+1 + AR(b − bα,R+1),b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R],R = T,...,1.
For any budget b ≥ 0, the corresponding optimal purchasing policy {(τk,d k)}k≥1 has dk =0
for all k and is an (R,b)-ﬂexible rule, where R is such that b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R].
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The idea of the proof is as follows. When the consumer decides whether to delay by d
a durable purchase, he weights the loss of service ﬂow against the ﬁnancial gain of paying
for the durable later. When r = ρ,t h eﬁnancial gain is less than the corresponding loss of
service (in fact, the result holds as long as the interest rate is not too high relative to ρ). An
arbitrary policy with delays can be modiﬁed recursively by eliminating one delay at a time
while maintaining the same budget and improving its value
4 Optimal budget allocation
We now solve problem (1) for the optimal consumption of non-durables as a function of α
and w. An agent with wealth w that spends b on durables optimally spends c =( 1 −β)(w−b)
per period on non-durables. Optimally, the agent should pick c (or, equivalently, b)s oa st o
equate the marginal utility of consumption ˆ u0(c) and the marginal utility of wealth V 0
α(b).
Figure 2 depicts the marginal utility of wealth (the falling step-function because Vα is a
concave piecewise linear function) and the marginal utility of consumption as functions of b
(for given values of α and w). In the ﬁgure, ˆ u0 crosses V 0
α at a point of discontinuity. This
depicts the situation when the optimal durable budget equals bα,R and the corresponding
durable purchasing policy is the R-ﬁxed rule. Now decrease w by a small amount. The
graph of ˆ u0((1 − β)(w − b)) will shift to the left, but it will still cross V 0
α at b = bα,R.I n
other words, there is an interval of wealths w for which it is optimal to follow the R-ﬁxed
rule in the state (α,w). If we further decrease w, ˆ u0 will eventually cross V 0
α at a point
where V 0
α is ﬂat and equal to AR. This is the case when it is optimal to choose a budget
corresponding to an R-ﬂexible rule and pick the non-durable budget cR,w h e r eˆ u0(cR)=AR.
Hence, there is also an interval of wealths w for which it is optimal to follow the R-ﬂexible
rule and spend cR in non-durables every period. For that range of wealths, the optimal non-
durable budget remains constant and variations of wealth aﬀect the durable consumption
path only (higher wealths aﬀord replacing durables at age R more frequently, while lower
92 , + R b α 1 , + R b α R b , α 1 , − R b α
() b Vα′
1 − R A
b
R A
1 + R A
() ) )( 1 ( b w u − − ′ β
2 , + R b α 1 , + R b α R b , α 1 , − R b α
() b Vα′
1 − R A
b
R A
1 + R A
() ) )( 1 ( b w u − − ′ β
Figure 2: Marginal utilities of consumption and wealth as functions of durable budget.
wealths require replacing durables at age R +1more often). In contrast, when a ﬁxed rule
is optimal, a higher wealth leads to a higher level of non-durable consumption.
For a ﬁxed α,i fw varies continuously from inﬁnity to zero, the intersection of ˆ u0 with V 0
α
in Figure 2 moves monotonically to the left and maps out the optimal durable replacement
rule (as a function of w). The wealthiest consumers use a 1-ﬁxed rule. Next comes a group
of consumers that follow 1-ﬂexible rule, and then a group that follows the 2-ﬁx e dr u l e ,a n ds o
on. The intervals of wealth where agents follow ﬁx e dr u l e sa r ei n t e r l a c e dw i t ht h ei n t e r v a l s
of wealth where they follow ﬂexible rules. The bounds of these intervals can be computed





b et h ew e a l t hr e q u i r e dt of o l l o wt h eR-ﬁxed rule and spend a constant non-durable budget
c per period when the initial durable is of age α. The wealthiest person that follows the
R-ﬂexible rule replaces his durable every R periods and consumes cR. Hence his wealth is
wα,R(cR). The poorest person that follows the (R −1)-ﬂexible rule also replaces his durable
every R periods but consumes cR−1 >c R, so that his wealth is wα,R(cR−1) >w α,R(cR).I n
between, there are consumers with wealth w ∈ [wα,R(cR),w α,R(cR−1)] that follow the R-ﬁxed
rule. Each one spends the same durable budget bα,R and the non-durable budget per period
cα,R(w)=( 1− β)(w − bα,R).
A consumer with more wealth than w1,1(c1)=( c1 + p0)/(1 − β) will replace his durable
every period and spend more than c1 p e rp e r i o di nn o n - d u r a b l e s . W ew i l la s s u m et h a t
¯ y/ρ ≥ w1,1(c1), and deﬁne ¯ w =¯ y/ρ and c0 =( 1− β)¯ w − p0. Similarly, a consumer with
less wealth than cT/(1 − β) will spend all his wealth in non-durable consumption. We will
assume that y/ρ ≤ cT/(1 − β), and deﬁne w = y/ρ and cT+1 =( 1− β)w.
We can also express the optimal purchasing policy (3), stated in Theorem 1, as a function
of wealth (and with abuse of notation denote this function by the same symbol δ
∗
α). The
following theorem states these results formally.
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cα,R(w) for w ∈ [wα,R(cR),w α,R(cR−1)],R = T +1 ,...,1








0 for w<w α+1,α+1(cα)
{0,1} for wα+1,α+1(cα) ≤ w ≤ wα−1,α(cα)
1 for w>w α−1,α(cα).
(4)
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Over time, a consumer that follows an R-ﬁxed rule has a constant holding time R and
r e v i s i t st h es a m ep o i n t si nt h es t a t es p a c e(α,w) every R periods. His wealth trajectory is
cyclical. While the consumer keeps the current good, both α and w increase, as the consumer
“saves” for the next purchase. When the new durable is purchased, both α and w go down,
and the holding cycle starts again.
The time path for wealth of a consumer that follows an R-ﬂexible rule is more erratic.
Usually, his wealth trajectory is not cyclical: each time the durable is of age R,h eh a sa
diﬀerent wealth level. For example, suppose that the consumer starts with a durable of age
R and wealth level w0 ∈ (wR−1,R(cR),w R,R(cR)). Then, he must replace the durable now,
and the next time his good reaches age R, his wealth will be wR =[ w0−p0]β
R <w 0.I fwR >
wR−1,R, he will have to replace the durable again. But eventually, if he continues to replace
each time the durable reaches age R, he will reach a state (R,w),w h e r ew<w R+1,R+1(cR).
At this point, he is forced to wait one more period. Thus, the agent will switch replacement
f r e q u e n c i e se r r a t i c a l l y ,a se a c ht i m et h a th i ss t a t ei so ft h ef o r m(R,w), his wealth level w is
in a diﬀerent region of the interval [wR+1,R(cR),w R,R(cR)].
4.1 Consumption classes
The optimal policies partition the state space (α,w) into disjoint classes, with each class
corresponding to a diﬀerent durable replacement rule. All individuals in a class follow the
same rule and the trajectories of their states stay forever in the same class. For every
R ∈ {1,...,T+1 } and α ∈ {1,...,R},l e t
W
α
R =[ wα,R(cR),w α,R(cR−1)]
be the wealth levels of consumers that follow an R-ﬁxed rule and currently have a durable
of age α. Similarly, for every R ∈ {1,...,T} and α ∈ {1,...,min{R +1 ,T}} let
W
α
R,R+1 =( wα,R+1(cR),w α,R(cR))
be the wealth levels of consumers that follow an R-ﬂexible rule and currently have a durable





R=1 forms a partition of [w, ¯ w].A tt h e
beginning of every period, agents with a state in CR =
SR
α=1{α}×Wα
R follow the R-ﬁxed rule,
and with a state in CR,R+1 =
SR+1
α=1{α}×Wα
R,R+1 follow the R-ﬂexible rule. Note that after
the initial period, nobody visits the states {α}×Wα
R, α>R ,o rt h es t a t e s{α}×Wα
R,R+1,
α>R+1 . A consumer with one of these initial states has been endowed with a durable
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Figure 3: Consumption classes; optimal consumption function c∗
1 (w).
that is “too old” for his initial wealth level. The classes CR and CR,R+1 are closed: if an
agent follows the R-ﬁxed rule (R-ﬂexible rule) and his initial state is in CR (CR,R+1), then
his state remains in CR (in CR,R+1) forever. Figure 3 illustrates consumption classes for the
case T =3and one of the corresponding optimal consumption function c∗
1 (w) described in
Theorem 3. Three horizontal lines on the lower panel of ﬁgure 3 represent the state space
{1,2,3}×[w, ¯ w]. Double lines indicate wealth intervals that belong to ﬁxed rule classes, and
single solid lines indicate ﬂexible rule classes. Class boundaries are marked by dashed lines.
Dotted lines indicate the intervals in the state space that are empty in the long run.
4.2 Durability and obsolescence
Aggregate durable and non-durable consumption both respond to aggregate changes in
wealth. Consumers in class CR have a ﬁxed durable budget and a positive marginal propen-
sity to consume non-durables (see ﬁgure 3). Therefore, if any such consumer receives windfall
income, he will spend it all on non-durable consumption. By contrast, consumers in a class
CR,R+1 have a zero marginal propensity to consume non-durables and a variable durable bud-
get. The magnitude of the overall response of durable consumption to a change in wealth
will depend on the mass of consumers in ﬁxed and ﬂexible rule classes. These masses, of
course, are functions of the wealth distribution. To isolate the eﬀect of the model’s param-
eters on the sensitivity of durable consumption, we assume a uniform distribution over the
set of recurrent states (i.e. the states marked by solid lines on ﬁgure 3). Then the mass of



















Given a small change in wealth, approximately6 θ consumers will adjust only their durable
consumption and 1−θ consumers will adjust only their non-durable consumption. The larger
is θ, the more sensitive is durable consumption to changes in wealth.
Assume that xα = g(T − α), α =0 ,...,T. This is the obsolescence pattern that arises
in the detrended model of Appendix 1. In this case, g represents the obsolescence rate — the
speed at which service ﬂow decays — and T represents the durability of the good — the length
of its useful life. The following proposition states that under some restrictions on preferences
faster obsolescence and higher durability both make durable consumption more sensitive to
changes in wealth.
Proposition 1 Let xα = g(T − α), α =0 ,...,T.T h e n
(i) An increase in the rate of obsolescence increases (decreases) θ if u has decreasing (in-
creasing) absolute risk aversion.
(ii) Assume that β
T(1+β) > 1 (so (2) is satisﬁed for T and T +1)a n du(c)= 1
1−γc1−γ with
0 <γ≤ γ∗ =1 .36.T h e n ,θ increases with durability (for any g and p0).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The critical value γ∗ =1 .36 has been computed numerically (and the proof explains
how γ∗ is deﬁned). A typical assumption on preferences is decreasing absolute risk aversion,
which implies that θ increases with the rate of obsolescence.
Proposition 1 separates the eﬀects of durability and obsolescence. Higher obsolescence
rate makes the service ﬂow decline more steeply with age. As a result, the endpoints of all
consumption classes shift downward. In contrast, expanding the lifetime of durables does
not shift class boundaries but changes the optimal replacement rule for consumers at the
bottom of the wealth distribution (that used to follow the (T +1 )-ﬁxed rule).
5 Empirical implications
5.1 Volatility of durable consumption
It is well-known that aggregate durable consumption is more volatile than aggregate non-
durable consumption. The standard PIH model (e.g. Mankiw, 1982, see also Appendix 2 for
details) can explain this. In the standard model, the short-run wealth elasticity of demand for
6A small mass of consumers will change their consumption class as a result of change in wealth.
13a durable is inversely proportional to its rate of economic depreciation. Therefore, demand
for durables (with depreciation rates less than 100%) should be more volatile than demand
for non-durables (with depreciation rate of 100%). However, the model also implies that
the smaller is the rate of depreciation of a good, the more volatile is its demand. The data
seems to contradict this. Figure 4 shows the year-on-year percentage change in investment
rate (i.e. the ratio of expenditure to stock) for three categories of durable goods: computers,
furniture and autos.7 Furniture has the lowest economic depreciation rate (0.1 annually) and
the least variable investment rate, computers have the highest economic depreciation (0.45)
and the most variable investment rate, and automobiles (depreciation rate 0.18) are in the
middle. The evidence on ﬁgure 4 suggests that durables with higher obsolescence rates have

















































































Figure 4: Changes in investment rate for three categories of durables.
Our model can simultaneously match both pieces of evidence, because it separates the
eﬀect of higher durability from that of slower obsolescence. In Proposition 1, we show that
consumption of longer-lived durables exhibit a stronger response to a wealth shock. This
makes our model consistent with the aggregate data. A higher rate of obsolescence also
makes durable consumption more volatile, which explains the pattern on ﬁgure 4.
5.2 Synchronization of purchases
Our model predicts that demand for durables is concentrated around the dates when the
new models come out, and we can look for such coordination using the data on household
purchases of computers. Figure 5 reproduces the plot for computers on the previous ﬁgure,
7Source: BEA. Consumption expenditures are taken from NIPA Table 2.6, lines 45 (new autos), 59
(furniture) and 73 (computers). The corresponding stocks of durable goods are from NIPA Table 8.1, lines














Figure 5: Accelerations in computer investment rate with the introduction of new models.
but adds the dates when the new generations of personal computers came on the market.
The general pattern on the ﬁgure is one-year expenditure spikes (in 1982, 86, 91 and 95)
followed by several years of falling investment rates. Apparently, computer expenditure is
concentrated around certain dates. If computer purchases were simply driven by the business
cycle, one would expect to see a positive correlation between investment rates across durable
categories. The data for computers show exactly the opposite. While investment rates
for autos and furniture are positively correlated, both exhibit a negative correlation with
computer investments.
Durable categories Correlation of investment rates, 1978-2001
Autos and furniture 0.49
Computers and autos -0.27
Computers and furniture -0.40
One dramatic example of this is the 1990-1991 recession when ﬁnal sales of autos plum-
meted 21% in real terms while ﬁnal sales of computers have doubled over the same period.
The spikes in computer expenditure seem to closely follow the introduction of new models
of PCs. The 1982 spike corresponds to the introduction of the IBM PC in the summer of
1981. The 1986 spike probably corresponds to mass purchases of 286 PCs. The ﬁrst one
of those was the IBM PC AT in late 1984, with most of the “AT compatibles” by Compaq
and other manufacturers becoming available in 1985. In the summer of 1986, Compaq also
introduced the ﬁrst 386 PC, but it probably was not a mass market model at the time. PC
magazine (Nov 25, 1986, p. 157) wrote: “Compaq says it knows perfectly well that this
is not a machine that will sell in huge volumes this year, nor, probably next.” The next
generation 486 processor was formally announced in the spring of 1989, but the initial chip
had bugs and a slower clock speed than the existing 386. The 486 50-MHz chip that oﬀered
signiﬁcant performance advantage over the 386 was not produced until October of 1990 (PC
Magazine, September 11, 1990, p. 100). The 1991 spike is consistent with pent-up demand
as advanced users were waiting for the faster 486 PC. The next Intel processor, the Pentium,
came out in 1993, however the purchase spike did not follow until 1995 for two reasons. The
initial Pentium cost twice as much as a 486 with the same speed, and this price premium
15was “inconsistent with the additional performance” (PC magazine, July 1993, p. 126). More
importantly, users may have been postponing computer upgrades until the arrival of the new
Windows 95 operating system.
It is interesting that the pattern of computer investment seems to have changed after
1995. We think this is because in the 1990s innovations in software and hardware became
more staggered and less synchronized with innovation in processors. For example, early on
machine language changed from one generation of processor to the next (e. g. PC magazine,
November 25, 1986, p. 154), and software innovations had to happen simultaneously to take
full advantage of new processors.
6V a r i a b l e s i z e s
In our model, wealth shocks aﬀect the timing of future durable purchases. Evidence of this
can be found in the data on auto sales, as the next subsection details. However, so far
we assumed that there is only one “size” for the durable. We now explore a model where
consumers can purchase durables of any size. We assume that a new durable of size S costs
p0S, and a durable of age α and size S provides a utility ﬂow Sηxα,w h e r eη ∈ (0,1).
Since a consumer can now adjust durable expenditure by changing the durable sizes, he
will only use ﬁxed rules. Moreover, Proposition 2 below shows that the same ﬁxed rule is
optimal for all the consumers. That is, when durables are replaced is no longer a function
of a consumer’s wealth.
Proposition 2: For all consumers, the optimal purchasing policy is the R∗-ﬁxed rule,
where
R





and the optimal purchase size for a consumer with a durable of age R∗ and a budget b is
S∗(b)=b/bT,R∗.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
In this model, wealth shocks are absorbed by changes in non-durable consumption and
durable size. The same result holds for a broader class of models, if we continue to assume
that depreciation rate of the durable does not depend on the purchase size. An (s,S)
replacement model with variable purchase size also predicts that the replacement frequency
is independent of wealth (see Appendix 2). Leahy and Zeira (2000) do ﬁnd that the dates
of durable purchases are a function of wealth, but their model assumes that consumers buy
durables at most once in their lifetime, an assumption that is inappropriate for cars.
We now introduce feasibility constraints. Speciﬁcally, assume that there is a maximum
size ¯ S. That is, consumers can choose durable sizes S ∈ [0, ¯ S]. Consumers with budgets
b ≤ ¯ SbT,R∗ (at the moment they replace the durable) will follow the R∗-ﬁxed rule, because for
them the constraint S ≤ ¯ S does not bind. Consumers with budgets b>¯ SbT,R∗ will partition
into ﬁxed-rule and ﬂexible-rule classes in much the same way as with ﬁxed purchase size. As
we will show below, for a range of values of η close to 1, a consumer with budget b>¯ SbT,R∗
and a useless durable will choose every future durable purchase to be of maximum size.
Therefore, his total durable consumption utility is ¯ SηVT(b/¯ S),w h e r eVT is the function
deﬁned earlier (for the case where durables are of size 1). More precisely, such a consumer
faces the same optimization problem as in Section 3, but where the durable costs p0 ¯ S and
16provides utility ﬂow ¯ Sηxα for α =0 ,...,T. Thus, for such a consumer, his optimal policy is
a ﬂexible rule. Proposition 3 states this result formally.
Proposition 3: Assume that vT,R/b
η
T,R is single-peaked in R and that η ∈ [η,1) where





Assume a consumer’s current state is (T,b) where b ∈ [bT,R+1 ¯ S,bT,R¯ S] for some 1 ≤ R<R ∗.
Then, his optimal policy is an R-ﬂexible rule with every durable purchase of size ¯ S.
Proof: See Appendix 1.8
Thus, consumers with relatively high budgets buy durables of size ¯ S only. These con-
sumers react to wealth shocks as if there is only one size available — those following a ﬁxed
rule, for example, will adjust their non-durable consumption only. In contrast, consumers
with relatively small budgets all follow an R∗-ﬁxed rule with variable purchase size. They
respond to a wealth shock by changing the sizes of their durables and their non-durable
consumption. Relaxing the size constraint by increasing ¯ S will make the latter group larger,
so that fewer people will adjust the dates of future durable purchases. Hence, the model pre-
dicts that for durables with a broad range of sizes, aggregate unit sales follow a deterministic
path (that depends on initial condition) as wealth shocks are absorbed by size variations.
To be clear, the time path for unit sales may not be stationary, but is not aﬀected by wealth
shocks either.
A minimum purchase size produces similar results. Relatively wealthy consumers are not
constrained by size and follow the R∗-ﬁxed rule. Those consumers that cannot even aﬀord
the R∗-ﬁxed rule with the minimum size follow R-ﬂexible rules with R>R ∗.
Empirical Evidence: Figure 6 presents the year-by-year growth rates for the number
of new autos and the average real expenditure per auto between 1950 and 2001.9 Over
that period, the number of cars sold is much more variable than the expenditure per car
(which is a good proxy for “size”). In theory, the number of autos sold can vary because
the distribution of auto stocks evolves over time, and each year there is a diﬀerent number
of cars that need to be replaced. Adda and Cooper (2000, section 4.3.2) estimated an (s,S)
model with auto sales data and simulated the time path for the distribution of auto stocks.
They found that the variations in this distribution are not a major source of ﬂuctuations in
sales. Then the shifts in purchase timing must the main reason why auto sales ﬂuctuate.
As explained above, constraints on sizes determine the relative importance of purchase
size and timing in the transmission of shocks. The history of the automobile market in the
US allows us to test this hypothesis. The market share of foreign cars has skyrocketed from
14% in 1972 to 35% in 1980, and has stabilized afterwards. Foreign cars initially cost about
8The solution can be more complex if η<η .F o r η in this range there may exist R<R ∗ and B∗
R ∈





the optimal policy is to follow a modiﬁed R-ﬂexible rule
that switches between buying a durable of size ¯ S and holding it for R +1periods and buying a durable of
size B∗





the optimal policy is the R-ﬁxed rule
with variable purchase size SR (b)=b/bT,R.
9Final sales of new autos are taken from NIPA table 8.8A line 2 (1949-1966) and table 8.8U line 4 (1967-
2002). The price index for new autos is from NIPA table 7.5 line 4. Auto sales for 1949-1966 are taken from
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (1958 and 1967) and from NIPA table 8.8M, line 1, for 1967-2002. The time
series for the civilian non-institutional population over age 16 is from the FRED database (series CNP16OV).
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Figure 6: Changes in number and real purchase size for autos, 1950-2001.
20% less, on average10, than domestic models (for comparison, a foreign car in 2002 cost
45% more, on average). Therefore, the mass introduction of foreign cars in the US market
must have expanded the range of available sizes. According to our model, we should expect
that in the 1980s and 1990s the number of autos sold became less variable and, at the same
time, the purchase size became more variable. To see if this is the case, we split the sample
into two intervals, before and after the introduction of foreign cars, and allow the cutoﬀ
year to vary from 1972 to 1980. Let σ1 and σ2 be the standard deviations of the time series
ln(Nt/Nt−1) for the periods 1950-1979 and 1980-2001, respectively, where Nt denotes the
unit auto sales per adult. For the same periods, let σ3 and σ4 be, respectively, the standard
deviations of ln(Et/Et−1),w h e r eEt denotes the average real expenditure per car. Then
σ1 =1 6 .0%,σ 2 =7 .7%,σ 3 =4 .0%, and σ4 =5 .5%.
The diﬀerence between σ1 and σ2 is highly signiﬁcant (P-value of the F-test is 0.0005), as
is the diﬀerence between σ3 and σ4 (P-value 0.053).11 These values do not change much
as we move the cutoﬀ from 1980 back to 1972.12 In the 1980s and 90s there is a volatility
10The average is taken over 1967-1980.
11The time series for ln(Nt/Nt−1) and ln(Et/Et−1) do not show signiﬁcant autocorrelation. The ﬁrst series
has the AR(1) coeﬃcient of -0.18 (P-value 0.203) and the AR(2) coeﬃcient of -0.14 (P-value 0.308). For
the ln(Et/Et−1) series, the AR(1) coeﬃcient is -0.21 (P-value 0.160) and AR(2) coeﬃcient is -0.01 (P-value
0.941).
12σ1 changes monotonically from 16.0 to 17.2 and σ2 varies almost monotonically in the range [7.5,9.2].
The P-value for the F-test is in [0.0001,0.0024]. Similarly, σ3 stays in the interval [3.7,4.1] while σ4 stays
in the interval [5.2,5.3]. The corresponding P-value for the F-test is in [0.042,0.117].
18moderation in the number of cars per adult, and a somewhat weaker increase in the volatility
of purchase size.
It is interesting that the volatility moderation in the number of autos is stronger than the
accompanying increase in the volatility of purchase size, and there may be an explanation for
it. There is a literature (e. g. Stock and Watson, 2002 and references therein) that presents
evidence of a general decline in the cyclical volatility of the economic activity in the US since
the early 1980s. Such a general decline would magnify the any volatility moderation and
counteract any volatility increase.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented a model of durable goods that highlights the diﬀerence between obsoles-
cence and physical wear and tear. The model is simple and it can be solved analytically.
It also has the ﬂexibility to simultaneously match empirical regularities on consumption be-
havior that other models cannot. We identify periodic obsolescence as a distinct source of
aggregate ﬂuctuations, and explain why purchase timing is a major channel for the trans-
mission of wealth shocks.
Our model oﬀers a building block for a general equilibrium analysis of an investment
problem with capital obsolescence. Periodic obsolescence makes investment spiky even at
the aggregate level, although interest rate adjustments will partially smooth out these spikes.
Our framework can generate cyclical investment patterns and suggests a relationship between
technological innovations in capital goods and the business cycle.
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208 Appendix 1: Proofs
Detrending: Our model can be viewed as the detrended version of a fully dynamic model
with a constant rate of technical progress. Suppose that a model τ provides a constant
service ﬂow zτ for the duration of its useful life, in the interval [τ,τ+T),a n dt h a tzτ = egτ,
where g is the rate of technical progress, or, equivalently, the rate of decrease of the quality-
adjusted price for the durable. Now assume that the consumers’ utility function is ˆ v(z,c)=
ln(z)+u(c),w h e r ez is the service ﬂow of the durable good and c is the ﬂow of non-durable
consumption. This dynamic model corresponds to the stationary model we propose when
xα = g(T − α) for α =0 ,...,T.
Indeed, let α : R+ → {0,...,T} and c : R+ → R+ be two measurable functions representing
the consumption trajectory of a consumer (where α(t) is the technological age of the durable
being consumed at time t). For any r ∈ R,l e tbrc denote the largest integer less than
or equal to r. Note that along that trajectory, the model being consumed at time t is
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.
Arbitrarily, we can re-normalize utility to set K =0without changing the consumer’s
preferences over consumption paths. Then, the total discounted utility coincides with that
of a consumer with utility function v(α,c)=xα + u(c).
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose the agent is endowed with a durable of age α and follows
an arbitrary purchasing policy τ = {τk}∞
k=1.W eﬁrst show that the total cost and value (b,v)
of policy τ can be represented as a convex combination of the points {(bT,R,v T,R)}
T+1
R=1.L e t





























for R =1 ,...,T,a n dl e tλT+1 =1−
PT
R=1 λR.T h u sλR ≥ 0 for all R,
PT+1
R=1 λR =1 ,a n d







































Put diﬀerently, (b,v − Xα,r0)=
P
R λR(bT,R,v T,R) is a convex combination of the two-
dimensional vectors (bT,R,v T,R).N o t et h a tw h e nα = T, Xα,r0 =0for all r0.13
We next deduce an optimal policy for the case where α = T (i.e., when the agent is
endowed with a useless durable). If b ≥ bT,1,t h ea g e n tc a na ﬀord to replace the durable
every period and VT(b)=vT,1 (moreover, if b>b T,1,i ti sn o tp o s s i b l ef o rt h ea g e n tt os p e n d
the budget b in durables). For what follows assume that b<b T,1.L e tR and λ
∗
R ∈ [0,1] be




R)bR+1.S i n c e(b,VT(b)) =
P
λR(bT,R,v T,R) for some nonnegative
weights λR adding to 1, we have that VT(b) ≤ λ
∗
RvT,R +( 1− λ
∗
R)vT,R+1. To conclude, we
only need to show that this bound is attained. For this we need to show that there exists













diﬀerently, we need to show that there exists an R-ﬂexible rule with budget b.
Assume that R<Tand let B∗
R denote the set of budgets b(τ) corresponding to policies
τ that are R-ﬂexible rules and satisfy τ1 =0(that is, τ makes a purchase in the ﬁrst
period). Let τ be such a policy and τ0 be its continuation policy from the period of the
second purchase onward: τ0
t = τt+1 − τ1 for all t ≥ 1. Then, τ0 is also an R-ﬂexible rule
and τ0
1 =0and its corresponding budget b(τ0) ∈ B∗
R.N o w ,e i t h e r b(τ)=p0 + β
Rb(τ0) (if
τ2 = R)o rb(τ)=p0+β
R+1b(τ0) (if τ2 = R+1). Therefore, B∗
R is the largest set B such that
B =[ p0+β
RB]∪[p0+β
R+1B]. Observe that p0+β
R+1bT,R+1 = bT,R+1 and p0+β
RbT,R = bT,R,
and that p0 +β
RbT,R+1 <p 0 +β
R+1bT,R when β
T−1(1+β) > 1.T h e r e f o r eB =[ bT,R+1,b T,R]
is a ﬁxed point of the above equation. Since p0+β
Rd<dfor all d>b T,R and p0+β
R+1d>d
for all d<b T,R+1, B is also the largest such ﬁxed point, and thus B∗
R = B.T h a ti s ,f o re a c h
budget b ∈ B∗
R =[ bT,R+1,b T,R] there exists a (R,b)-ﬂexible rule (that spends the budget b
exactly). The proof for R = T is similar (here bT,T+1 =0and we must consider policies τ
where τk+1 − τk >T+1for some k).
Finally, observe that if (T,b) i st h ei n i t i a ls t a t ea n dτ and ˆ τ are two (R,b)-ﬂexible rules
(they spend the same budget b), then their corresponding λR (and 1 − λR)m u s tc o i n c i d e ,
and therefore they must have the same value as well. In particular, if b ∈ [bT,R+1,b T,R],t h e n
any R-ﬂexible rule that spends the budget b exactly is an optimal policy.
By construction, the value of following an (R,b)-ﬂexible rule starting from a durable of
age T is given by
VT (b)=vT,R+1 + AR (b − bT,R+1), b ∈ [bT,R+1,b T,R], R = T,...,1.
When the endowed durable is of age α<T , the corresponding optimal value function
Vα (b) can be deduced from VT (b) from the observation that the continuation of an optimal
policy is an optimal policy for the subproblem that arises in the second period after following
the policy in the ﬁrst period.




t. While KR contains the purchase numbers, LR contains the purchase periods of
durables that are disposed at age R. However, for other purposes, the set KR is more convenient.
22If starting with a budget b ∈ [p0,b T,1]=[ bT+1,T+1,b T,1], a consumer buys a durable in the
ﬁr s tp e r i o da n dt h e nk e e p si tf o rt h en e x tα−1 p e r i o d s ,h i sb u d g e ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o d
α ≥ 1 is θα(b)=( b − p0)/β
α.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra n y1 ≤ R ≤ T +1and 1 ≤ α ≤ min {R,T},
θα(bT,R)=bα,R.
Assume that the initial state is (α,b),w h e r e1 ≤ α<Tand b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R] for
some α ≤ R ≤ T.L e t ˜ b = p0 + β
αb.T h e n b = θα(˜ b).S i n c e b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R],i t
must be that ˜ b ∈ [bT,R+1,b T,R]. Therefore, starting at state (T,˜ b), it is optimal to fol-
low an R-ﬂexible rule. Assume he does so. Then, after α periods his state becomes
(α,b),a n df r o ms t a t e(α,b) he must be following an R-ﬂexible rule as well. Hence, the
agent must keep the durable for another R − α periods (at least). At that point, he
arrives at state (R,b/β
R−α).N o t e t h a t (1/β
R−α)[bα,R+1,b α,R]=[ bR,R+1,b R,R] and that
β
R−αbR+1,R+1 = bα+1,R+1 ∈ (bα,R+1,b α,R). Hence, if b/β
R−α ∈ [bR,R+1,b R+1,R+1) he must
keep the durable this period and buy a new durable next period, so his continuation value
is ˆ xR + VT(b/β
R+1−α).I fb/β
R−α ∈ [bR+1,R+1,b R,R] he can optimally buy a new durable this






R+1−α) for b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α+1,R+1)
Xα,R + β
R−αVT(b/β
R−α) for b ∈ [bα+1,R+1,b α,R].
Suppose that b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α+1,R+1).T h e nb/β
R+1−α ∈ [bR+1,R+1,b R+1,R+1/β) ⊂ [bT,R+1,b T,R].
Therefore, VT(b/β
R+1−α)=vT,R+1 + AR(b/β
R+1−α − bT,R+1),a n d
Xα,R+1 + β
R+1−αVT(b/β
R+1−α)=vα,R+1 + AR(b − bα,R+1).
Now suppose that b ∈ [bα+1,R+1,b α,R].T h e n b/β











R−α)=vα,R+1 + AR(b − bα,R+1).
Therefore, for all α ≤ R ≤ T and b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R], Vα(b)=vα,R+1 + AR(b − bα,R+1).
It remains to ﬁnd Vα(b) for b>b α,α. We claim that Vα(b)=VT(b) for all b>b α,α.S i n c e
bα,R = bT,R for all R ≤ α,w eh a v et h a tVT(b)=vα,R+1+AR(b−bα,R+1) for all b ∈ [bα,R+1,b α,R]
and 1 ≤ R<α , and the claim would complete the proof. To prove our claim, we show that
VT(b) >X α,s+α + β
sVT(b/β
s) for all s>0 and b>b α,α.
That is, when b>b α,α, the consumer strictly prefers to replace the durable immediately
t h a nt or e p l a c ei ta ta n yl a t e rt i m e . O n ec a nc h e c kt h a tt h ea b o v ei n e q u a l i t yh o l d sw h e n
b = bα,α.A l s o ,s i n c eVT is concave, the function VT(b) has a higher slope than the function
on the right hand side for any b>0. Hence, the inequality holds for every b>b α,α.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :Consider an arbitrary purchasing policy {(τk,d k)}∞
k=1,w h e r e
τk + dk denotes the time of the k-th purchase and τk ∈ N its corresponding period (so
dk ∈ [0,1) denotes its “delay”). Let τ0 = −α and rk =m i n{τk+1 −τk,T} for all k ≥ 0.T h e
























τk(x0 − xrk−1)(1 − e
−ρdk)/ρ.























































Observe that for 1 ≤ R ≤ T −1, k −1 ∈ KR implies that τk = τk−1 +R (if k −1 ∈ RT then




























Thus, ¯ γT =
PT−1
R=1 λR + λT/(1 − β
T).L e t µ =( 1− e−ρS)/(1 − β) (note that µ<1),
Λ = {λ ∈ RT
+ |
PT


















CLAIM 1: Let {(τk,d k)} be an arbitrary purchasing policy and (λ,γ) be the weights
deﬁned by (5). Then (λ,γ) ∈ Γ.C o n v e r s e l y ,f o r a n y (λ,γ) ∈ Γ, there exists a purchasing
policy {(τk,d k)} that satisﬁes (5). Though this policy is usually not unique, all such policies
have the same budget and value. Thus, with abuse of notation we will also refer to a
(λ,γ) ∈ Γ as a purchasing policy.
CLAIM 2: Suppose that the policy corresponds to an R-ﬂexible rule where τ1 =0and
the replacement of durables of age R+1is never delayed but the replacement of durables of
age R is sometimes delayed. Then, the policy is suboptimal: there exists another R-ﬂexible
r u l ew i t h o u td e l a y st h a tc o s t st h es a m ea n dh a sas t r i c t l yh i g h e rv a l u e .
Proof: For such a policy, λR + λR+1 =1 , γR > 0, γR+1 =0 ,a n dλk = γk =0for all
k/ ∈ {R,R+1}.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eγR <λ Rβ
R/(1−β
R),w ea l s oh a v eλR > 0.I nt h i sc a s e ,(ˆ b, ˆ v)
is on the “Pareto frontier” (i.e., ˆ v = Vα(ˆ b)). The vector (ˆ b, ˆ v) − (b,v)=( p0(1 − β), ˆ x0 − ˆ xR)










≤ (1 − β
R)
ˆ x0 − ˆ xR
p0(1 − β)
<σ .
So, as the delays increase (γR increases), (b,v) moves away of (ˆ b, ˆ v), below the Pareto frontier.
But, if σ<A R+1, the delays may eventually take (b,v) back above the Pareto frontier. This
c o u l dh a p p e no n l yi fb<b T,R+1. But even if every durable of age R is replaced with delay,
t h ec o s to ft h ep o l i c yi sm o r et h a nr e p l a c i n gt h ed u r a b l e sa ta g eR+1all the time. That is,
24b ≥ bT,R+1. Therefore bT,R+1 ≤ b ≤ bT,R and v<V T(b), and there exists another R-ﬂexible
rule with no delays that costs b and has value VT(b).
CLAIM 3: Suppose that the policy {(τk,d k)} is such that γk > 0 for some k.T h e nt h e
policy is suboptimal: there exists another policy without delays that uses the same budget
but has strictly higher value.
Assume that the policy has delays. We now recursively modify the policy by eliminating
delays while maintaining the same budget and improving its value in every step. Let h =


































ˆ x0 − ˆ xR
¸¸
.
The weights (ˆ λ1, ˆ λ2, ˆ γ1) represent a 1-ﬂexible rule with delays (and ˆ λ1 + ˆ λ2 =1 ). If γ1 > 0
(so ˆ γ1 > 0), then by Claim 3 there exists another 1-ﬂexible rule with weights (˜ λ1, ˜ λ2,0) that
is better. Let λ
0
k = h˜ λk for k =1 ,2, γ0
1 =0 , λ
0
k = λk for k ≥ 3,a n dγ0
k = γk for k ≥ 2.T h e
policy (λ
0,γ0) is better than the policy (λ,γ) and has γ0




3, ˆ λk = λ
0
k/h
for k =2 ,3,a n dˆ γ2 = γ0
2/h.T h ew e i g h t s(ˆ λ2, ˆ λ3, ˆ γ2) represent a 2-ﬂexible rule with delays.
Again, if ˆ γ2 > 0, Claim 3 implies that there exists a better 2-ﬂexible rule without delays
t h a tc a nb eu s e dt om o d i f y(λ
0,γ0) and construct a new policy (λ
00,γ00) that is better, uses
the same budget, and has γ00
1 = γ00
2 =0 .C o n t i n u i n g t h i s w a y , a f t e r T steps, we will have
constructed a policy (λ
∗,γ∗) with γ∗ =0 , that uses the same budget and has a better value
than (λ,γ).
Finally, by Claim 2 (or Theorem 1), for any weights λ
∗,t h e r ee x i s tR and an R-ﬂexible
rule that uses the same budget b =
P
k λkbT,k and delivers a (weakly) better value. Therefore,
the optimal value function VT for the continuous-time economy coincides with that for the
discrete-time economy (as deﬁned in Theorem 1).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :Recall that we deﬁned c0 =¯ w(1−β)−p0 and cT+1 = w(1−β),
so that w1,1(c0)=¯ w and wT,T+1(cT+1)=w.
Let B(w,c)=w − c/(1 − β) be the budget left for durables when the total wealth is w
and the agent consumes a constant per period budget c on non-durables. For ﬁxed α and
w, the function ϕ(c)=ˆ u(c)/(1 − β)+Vα(B(w,c)) is concave. Thus ˆ c maximizes ϕ(c) if
and only if 0 ∈ ∂ϕ(ˆ c) (that is, 0 is a subdiﬀerntial of ϕ at ˆ c)o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,i fa n do n l yi f
ˆ u0(ˆ c) ∈ ∂Vα(B(w,ˆ c)). There are two cases corresponding to the situations where (1) Vα is
diﬀerentiable at B(w,ˆ c);a n d( 2 )Vα has a kink at B(w,ˆ c).
Case 1: Observe that B(w,cR) ∈ (bα,R+1,b α,R) if and only if w ∈ (wα,R+1(cR),w α,R(cR)).
Now, if B(w,cR) ∈ (bα,R+1,b α,R) for some R,t h e nˆ u0(cR)=AR = V 0
α(B(w,cR)),a n dcR
is the optimal solution of problem (1). That is, when w ∈ (wα,R+1(cR),w α,R(cR)),i ti s
optimal to consume a constant ﬂow cR of non-durables and follow an R-ﬂexible purchasing
rule for the durable good. One can check that B(w,cα)=bα+1,α+1 ⇔ w = wα+1,α+1(cα)
and B(w,cα)=bα−1,α ⇔ w = wα−1,α(cα),a n dwα,α+1(cα) <w α+1,α+1(cα) <w α−1,α(cα) <
wα,α(cα). Therefore, δ
∗(w) is given by (4).
Case 2: Observe that AR−1 ≤ ˆ u0(cα,R(w)) ≤ AR if and only if cR ≤ cα,R(w) ≤ cR−1,
or alternatively, if and only if w ∈ [wα,R(cR),w α,R(cR−1)].S i n c e B(w,cα,R(w)) = bα,R and
∂Vα(bα,R)=[ AR−1,A R],i fˆ u0(cα,R(w)) ∈ [AR−1,A R] for some R,t h e ncα,R(w) is the optimal
25solution of problem (1). That is, it is optimal to consume a constant ﬂow cα,R(w) of non-
durables and follow the R-ﬁxed purchasing rule for the durable good. In particular, δ
∗(w)=1
if R ≤ α (or equivalently, if w ≥ wα,α(cα))a n dδ
∗(w)=0if R>α , as stated in (4).
For a ﬁxed α, the intervals corresponding to case 1 alternate with those corresponding
to case 2. Moreover, collectively, they are mutually exclusive and cover the whole wealth
range.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :



















(Recall that c0 =( 1 −β)¯ w−p0 and cT+1 =( 1 −β)w.) Similarly, since wα,R(cR)−wα,R+1(cR)=
bα,R − bα,R+1,w eh a v et h a tµ(CR,R+1)=p0/(1 − β
R) for 1 ≤ R ≤ T − 1,a n dµ(CT,T+1)=




































































If u has decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion then so does ˆ u,a n ds i n c ec1 >c 2 >
















< 0( > 0).
(ii) Let xα = g(T − α) for α =1 ,...,T and x0
α = g(T0 − α) for α =1 ,...,T0,w h e r e




















This implies that the economy where durables last T periods and the economy where durables
last T0 >Tperiods have identical consumption levels c1,...,c T.







For all consumption classes to be non-empty, the interval [w, ¯ w] must be such that ¯ w(1−β) >
c1 + p0 and w(1 − β) <c T.W e n o w s e t w =0 , in order to guarantee that class CT+1 is
non-empty for all T. Inequality (6) is harder to satisfy for smaller values of ¯ w.T h e r e f o r e ,
we set ¯ w =( c1+p0)/(1−β). If inequality (6) is satisﬁed for this ¯ w then it must also hold for
any larger ¯ w.S i n c eˆ u(c)=[ ( 1− β)/ρ]γ[c1−γ/(1 − γ)], cR =( 1− β)A
−1/γ
R /ρ. The left hand




























Noticed that since AR is proportional to g, the above expression does not depend on g,
and is only a function of β and γ. Similarly, ψT+1/ψT depends only on β.N u m e r i c a l
computations shows that there exists ˆ γ(β) > 0 such that (6) holds for all γ ∈ (0,ˆ γ(β)].I f
we let γ∗ =m i n β ˆ γ(β)=1 .36, then, independent of β, θ is increasing in T.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :Let Sk denote the size of the k-th purchased durable. When
the endowed durable is of size S0 and age α,t h ev a l u ea n dt h ec o s to fad u r a b l ep u r c h a s i n g














Given a budget b, the consumer wants to maximize the value v.T h eﬁrst-order condition for
Sk is ηS
η−1
k X0,rk = µp0,w h e r eµ>0 is a Lagrange multiplier. This condition implies that
the optimal sizes depend on the holding time only. That is, for each R for which KR 6= ∅,
there exists a common size SR such that Sk = SR for all k ∈ KR. Then, following the
notation in the proof of Theorem 1, the policy (τ,S) can alternatively be represented as a


















R and b =
T+1 X
R=1




where BR = bT,Rˆ SR for 1 ≤ R ≤ T and BT+1 =0 . In this format, the consumer chooses





T,R] for all R 6= R∗. Therefore, it is optimal to set λR∗ =1and
λR =0for all R 6= R∗. That is, for any budget b, the optimal policy is an R∗-ﬁxed
rule with a constant size, where the size S∗(b) is adjusted to spend the budget b exactly:
S∗(b)=b/bT,R∗.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :As argued in the proof of Proposition 2, in an optimal policy,
for each R there exists an optimal size ˆ SR such that whenever a durable of age R is replaced,
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Figure 7: Functions ΦR(B) for T =4and R∗ =3 .
the new durable is of size ˆ SR.L e t ΦR(B)=[ vT,R/b
η
T,R]Bη for B ∈ [0, ¯ SbT,R]. Then, the












BR ∈ [0, ¯ SbT,R],λ R ≥ 0, 1 ≤ R ≤ T.
That is, J(b) is the convex envelope of the functions ΦR on [0, ¯ SbT,R], 1 ≤ R ≤ T.S i n c e
vT,R/b
η
T,R is single-peaked in R and ¯ SbT,R is monotonically decreasing in R, the graphs of the
functions ΦR are ordered in the following fashion. For each R<R ∗, the graph of ΦR+1 lies
above (or “dominates”) the graph of ΦR on the interval [0, ¯ SbT,R+1], but while the graph of
ΦR+1 stops at ¯ SbT,R+1, the graph of ΦR extends to the right until ¯ SbT,R > ¯ SbT,R+1.I nt h e
other direction, for each R>R ∗,t h eg r a p ho fΦR∗ dominates the graph of every ΦR and
the domain of the former [0, ¯ SbT,R∗] includes the domain of the latter [0, ¯ SbT,R].T h e r e f o r e ,
J(b)=ΦR∗(b) for all b ∈ [0, ¯ SbT,R∗].T o t h e r i g h t o f¯ SbT,R∗, we show that the assumption
on η implies that J is the piecewise linear function obtained by joining for each R<R ∗ the
vertices (¯ SbT,R+1,ΦR+1(¯ SbT,R+1)) and (¯ SbT,R,ΦR(¯ SbT,R)).N o t et h a tΦR(¯ SbT,R)=¯ SηvT,R,s o
that the piecewise linear function coincides with ¯ SηVT(b/¯ S) for b ∈ [¯ SbT,R∗, ¯ SbT,1].
To verify our last claim, all we need to do is to check that for each R<R ∗,t h es t r a i g h t
line segment from (¯ SbT,R+1,ΦR+1(¯ SbT,R+1)) to (¯ SbT,R,ΦR(¯ SbT,R)) l i e sa b o v et h eg r a p ho fΦR
in the interval [¯ SbT,R+1, ¯ SbT,R].S i n c e ΦR i sc o n c a v ea n dt h es l o p eo ft h el i n es e g m e n ti s











η−1 ≥ ¯ S
η−1AR.
That is, if and only if η ≥ ARbT,R/vT,R for all R<R ∗. Our assumption on η guarantees the
last inequality independent of the value of R∗.
9 Appendix 2: Alternative models of durables
The frictionless PIH model: The stock of durable good, Kt, evolves according to
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + Et,
where δ<1 is the rate of economic depreciation and Et is the current expenditure on durable
goods. Service ﬂow from the durable is proportional to Kt. Assume the interest rate r is












t (ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt)=w.
The optimal solution is Kt = Aw and ct = Bw for all t,w h e r eA =( 1− β)/[r +2 δ] and
B =( r+δ)A. Therefore, the optimal durable expenditure every period is E = δAw.S u p p o s e
that a shock changes the wealth from w to (1 +  )w. Then, the non-durable consumption
level changes from Bw to (1+ )Bw and desired durable stock changes from Aw to (1+ )Aw.
Therefore, the current period durable expenditure is (1+ )Aw−(1−δ)Aw =( 1+ /δ)δAw.
That is, the short-run wealth elasticity of demand is 1 for the non-durable good and 1/δ for
the durable good.
The (s,S) replacement model: Consider a model in continuous time with continuous
technological obsolescence, where a durable good of age t ≥ 0 and size S provides a service
ﬂow Sηx(t). Assume that η ∈ (0,1),a n dt h a tx(t) > 0 and x0(t) < 0 for all t ≥ 0.T h e
discount factor is ρ, the interest rate is r = ρ, and the price of a durable of size S is p0S.A
consumer with wealth w chooses non-durable consumption ﬂow c, durable purchase size S















1 − e−ρR = w.





















14The results are similar for a more general class of preferences and other values of r. See, for example,
Carroll and Dunn (1997).
















Therefore, the optimal holding time does not depend on wealth. Given that every consumer
replaces durables with the same frequency, c and S are strictly increasing in w.T h e r e f o r e ,
R will not respond to an aggregate wealth shock, but both c and S will.
30